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NOTES
REMEDIES FOR INDIVIDUALS WRONGLY DETAINED
IN STATE MENTAL INSTITUTIONS BECAUSE OF
THEIR INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL:
IMPLEMENTING JACKSON V. INDIANA
INTRODUCTION
A determination that a defendant lacks competency to stand trial'
can be the most crucial decision in a criminal proceeding. It may, in
fact, be the final determination in the criminal process for that defen-
dant. 2 In a majority of jurisdictions, such a finding results in an auto-
natic commitment to a state mental hospital for an indeterminate pe-
I. The term "competency to stand trial" is used interchangeably with "present sanity,"
"present capacity" and "sanity at time of trial." The standard of competency, as articulated by
the Supreme Court adopting the standard proposed by the Solicitor General is
"whether he [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Dusk) v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
The statutory provisions of most states tend to obscure these criteria by speaking in terms of
"insanity" or some other form of mental deviance. Even where the term is sufficiently defined, it
is often misapplied by the examining psychiatrist or the committing court. On the general problems
of articulating and applying the incompetency standard, see Bacon, Incompelency to Stand Trial:
Commitment to an Eclnsive Test, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 444 (1969); Bennett, Competenc, to Stand
Trial. .4 Call For Reform, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 569 (1968); Robey, Criteria for Competency
to Stand Trial.- A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PS'YCHIAT. 616 (1965). See also Aponte
v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 153 A.2d 665 (1959), for an excellent discussion of the distinction between
mental illness and competency to stand trial.
2. A study of an institute for the criminally insane in Michigan concluded that over 50
percent of the patients committed as incompetent would remain at the institute for the rest of their
lives without ever reaching the trial stage. Comment, Insane Persons-Competency to Stand Trial,
59 Micii. L. REV. 1078 (1961). Sample surveys conducted at other institutions would seem to
indicate that this finding is hardly unique. See, e.g.. Rosenberg, Competency for Trial-Who
Knows Best. 6 CRM. L. BULL. 577, 578 (1970) (quoting statistics from national survey of 58
institutions).
Even where the incompetent defendant gains competency and is certified competent by the
detaining institution, the probability that he will return to the trial process is somewhat remote.
In many of the cases, even those involving homicide, the charges against the defendants are
dismissed by the prosecutor when an accused is remanded to the court as restored to competence.
A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND TIlE CRIMINAL LAW: A FIELD STUDY 147-49 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as A. MATTIIEWS]. Several factors account for these dismissals, particularly the
length of detention of most incompetent defendants (which weakens the prosecutor's case) and the
desire to avoid prosecuting against a complicated insanity defense. Id. at 149. Nonetheless, numer-
ous cases have arisen where the prosecutor has attempted to go forward with the trial after
prolonged confinement. See notes 33 and 34 infra and accompanying text.
With these factors in mind, it is clear that the commitment of the incompetent defendant may
et al.: Remedies for Individuals Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
204 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
riod.t Moreover, once the disability is removed,4 the accused defendant
must again face the pending criminal charges.
5
The abuses of the process of pretrial commitment' have led many
well represent the final disposition of his case, and courts in many jurisdictions seem to have
adopted this attitude. See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND TIE LAW 417
(rev. ed. 1971) (accounting for the reluctance of courts to consider restoration cases) [hereinafter
cited as S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK].
3. An exhaustive survey of state incompetency statutes disclosed the following:
In at least forty-two jurisdictions hospitalization is mandatory for persons adjudged incap-
able of standing trial or being sentenced. In the remaining jurisdictions hospitalization is
entirely discretionary or, in some states, conditioned upon the court's finding that release
of the accused would be "dangerous" or a "menace."
S. BRAKLL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 415. While a few states provide for conditional release of
the incompetent defendant by parole, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.21(6) (Supp. 1972), in most states
release is contingent upon either dismissal of the criminal charges or restoration of competency to
stand trial. See, e.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370 (West 1970). The commitment thus becomes
indelinite irrespective of the policies controlling the need for continued confinement such as "dan-
gcrousness" or "need for care or treatment." For a discussion of the distinction between the criteria
for indelinite commitment and the criteria for incompetency to stand trial see Note, Incompetency
to Stand Trial. 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 461-66 (1967).
In some jurisdictions the indefinite nature of an incompetency commitment has been amelio-
rated by judicial decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 254 N.E.2d 779
(1969) (Massachusetts' civil commitment statute incorporated into incompetency statute after 35
day observation period). In the federal courts, if it does not appear that the defendant will be ready
for trial within a reasonable period, it has long been recognized that he is entitled to release if he
is not dangerous to the public interest, or recommitment in a state institution under an appropriate
civil statute. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970);
United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156
(W.D. Mo. 1961); Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
4. Unfortunately, the restoration question has also been obscured by statutory language. In
most jurisdictions the focus is upon the defendant's recovery of "sanity" rather than his ability to
rationally consult with counsel and understand the nature of the proceedings against him. In
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Court was faced with such a statute but interpreted
restoration of sanity to be equivalent to the restoration of competency to stand trial. Id. at 720
n.2. It is apparent, however, that most psychiatrists and many courts take the term quite literally.
See. e.g., Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome Extended. The Treatment of Mentally
Ill "Non-Criminal Criminals" in New York, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 412 n.153 (1969) (report of
interviews with state psychiatr,sts); Rosenberg, supra note 2.
5. Resumption of the criminal process is contemplated in every jurisdiction and is generally
provided for by statute. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 417. Some states have ameliorated
the basic unfairness of resumption of the trial after long periods of confinement by placing time
limits within which the incompetent defendant must be brought to trial or have the charges
dismissed. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRlM. PRO. § 730.50 (McKinney 1971). On the difficulties engen-
dered by the pending criminal charges see notes 31-65 infra and accompanying text.
6. Ostensibly, the rule is designed to protect the defendant from an unfair trial. Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Despite this altruistic purpose, it is often misused to the serious
detriment of the defendant. Some of the more blatant abuses occur when the incompetency issue
is raised by the trial judge or prosecutor as a jurisdictional ploy, based on a meritless charge, to
rid the community of undesirables, to avoid a prolonged trial involving an insanity defense, or as
a pretrial discovery device to ascertain the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged
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legal and psychiatric commentators to call for reform.7 In Jackson v.
Indiana,' the United States Supreme Court expressed similar dissatis-
faction with the practice of the automatic and indefinite commitment
of the incompetent defendant. In a unanimous decision (Mr. Justice
Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Powell not participating), the Court held that
the indefinite commitment of an accused to a state mental hospital
because of his incompetency to stand trial was unconstitutional. Such a
commitment, employing one standard for the commitment and release
of the mentally ill in general and another standard for the commitment
of the mentally ill accused of crime, deprived the accused of his rights
to due process and equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
The Jackson decision forms a basis for affirmative relief for those
individuals who are currently being detained in state mental institutions
because of their incompetency to stand trial. This note will focus on the
form of relief these individuals may reasonably expect and the methods
of obtaining that relief.
THE JACKSON DECISION
The Jackson case presented the Court with a compelling vehicle for
its most recent expression on the issue of competency to stand trial. The
defendant was accused of the separate robberies of two women.? The
value of the goods allegedly taken totalled nine dollars. In a pretrial
hearing, it was determined that Jackson, a mentally deficient deaf-mute,
was incompetent to stand trial.is Despite psychiatric testimony that
crime. See A. MATTHEWS, supra note 2. at 89-100; Eizenstat, Mental Competenc, to Stand Trial,
4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. Lin. L. REV. 379, 379-81 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Eizenstat]. There
is also the possibility of abuse by the defense attorney, as where the competency issue is raised
merely as a dilatory tactic. See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 160, 161-62
(1971) (interview with prosecutors and defense attorneys disclosing their use of the incompetency
issue).
7. A recent bibliographical listing can be found in S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at
423-29, which cites numerous cases and commentaries on both the insanity defense and the issue
of incompetency to stand trial.
8. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
9. The robberies allegedly took place in July 1967. The affidavits, however, were not filed
until May 1968. The merits of the charges against Jackson and the possible defenses he might have
raised (for example, lack of mens rea) were never determined. The trial court, upon receipt of
Jackson's not guilty pleas, initiated proceedings to determine Jackson's competency to stand trial.
Id. at 717.
10. Unquestionably, Jackson did meet the standard for incompetency to stand trial. Besides
being deaf and dumb and blind in one eye, Jackson possessed the mentality of a preschool child.
His only means of communication was through rudimentary gestures, and three years of out-
patient training at the Deaf and Dumb School in Indianapolis had proved futile. The testifying
psychiatrists expressed grave doubts that Jackson would ever recover. Id. at 719.
19731 et al.: Remedies for Individuals Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institu
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Jackson would never gain competency to stand trial, he was ordered
confined in a state mental institution until declared "sane." Such an
order clearly condemned him to languish in a state mental institution
for the remainder of his life.
On appeal of Jackson's request for a new trial," the majority of the
Indiana Supreme Court all but ignored the constitutional arguments.
The court simply stated:
Appellant's argument, that the statute in question is un-
constitutional because it imprisons appellant possibly for life,
must fail. The legislature under its police power may provide
for the safety, health, and general welfare. This necessarily
includes the confinement, care and treatment of the mentally
defective, retarded or insane.'"
As the strong dissent by Judge DeBruler indicates, the majority utterly
failed to take into account the appellant's mental and physical condi-
tion, the purpose behind committing a criminal defendant who is incom-
petent to stand trial, and the constitutional limitation on Indiana's
power to commit an individual indefinitely.'"
Because of the important constitutional question presented, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Court reversed and held that Indiana could not constitutionally
commit Jackson for an indefinite period solely on account of his incom-
petency to stand trial.15
Relying heavily on Baxstrom v. Herold," the Court ruled that
11. 253 Ind. 487, 255 N.E.2d 515 (1970). Jackson was perhaps fortunate that a review of
the commitment order was appealable. Some jurisdictions have apparently taken the position that
such an order is not appealable prior to a final judgment as to his guilt or innocence for the crime
charged. See, e.g., People v. Sepanek, 2 Il. App. 3d 437, 275 N.E.2d 926 (1971); Lang v. State,
238 Miss. 677, 119 So. 2d 608 (1960); Cogburn v. State, 198 Tenn. 431, 281 S.W.2d 38 (1955). A
denial of appeal where the defendant is ruled competent and the trial proceeds is perhaps defensible
on the grounds that there is no termination of the proceedings and the decision may be appealed
in a brief period of time. Desho v. State, 237 Ind. 308, 145 N.E.2d 429 (1957). Where, however,
the ruling is that the defendant is incompetent, the better view would seem to be that the order is
appealable. Inasmuch as the defendant's mental condition might be of long duration and his trial
delayed over a long period of time (perhaps forever), the order adjudging him incompetent for trial
seems sufficiently final to allow the appeal. People v. Fields, 62 Cal. 2d 538, 399 P.2d 369, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 833, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 858 (1965).
12. 253 Ind. at 492, 255 N.E.2d at 518.
13. Id. at 492-95, 255 N.E.2d at 518-19.
14. 401 U.S. 973 (1971),
15. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
16. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
[Vol. 7
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Indiana's pretrial commitment procedures deprived Jackson of equal
protection. The Baxstrom Court held that conviction and sentencing
were insufficient justifications for the differences in procedural and sub-
stantive standards in the commitment of the mentally ill. Baxstrom was
denied equal protection when he was deprived of a jury trial and the
judicial finding of dangerousness afforded to all others civilly committed
to an institute for the criminally insane.
Utilizing the Baxstrom principle the Court reasoned:
If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are in-
sufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to
all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot
suffice. 17
While the procedural standards were basically the same in Jackson, the
alternative standards for commitment and release were substantially
different.'
The Court concluded that, since Jackson was subjected "to a more
lenient standard of commitment and more stringent standard of release
than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offen-
ses,"" he was deprived of his constitutional right of equal protection of
the law. For closely related reasons, the Court also found that Jackson
was deprived of his right to due process.20
The ostensible purpose of pretrial commitment of an incompetent
defendant is to treat his condition so that he may stand trial. Jackson's
17. 406 U.S. at 724.
18. Under Indiana's general commitment statutes, it would be necessary for the state to show
that Jackson was feebleminded or mentally ill, in need of care or treatment, and required detention
for the protection of himself or others. In contrast, under the pertinent Indiana statute for pretrial
commitment of an incompetent, it need only be shown that Jackson lacked competency to stand
trial. Compare IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972) (incompetency to stand trial) with IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 22-1201 to 1256 (Supp. 1972) (statutory scheme for involuntary civil commitments)
and IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-1801 to 1919 (Supp. 1972) (provisions for the feebleminded). The
standard for commitment is thus more lenient for those accused of crime than for those being
committed generally.
The comparative standards of release were also at a substantial variance. An individual
committed under the feebleminded provisions may be released when his condition justifies it. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 22-1814 (1964). If committed as mentally ill, an individual could gain release if
discharged by the administrator or when cured. IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1223 (1964). Jackson,
however, if committed under IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972), had to gain competency
to stand trial, an event highly unlikely ever to occur.
19. 406 U.S. at 730.
20. Id. at 731.
1973]
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physical and mental condition virtually precluded that possibility; for all
practical purposes Jackson's commitment was indefinite.2 Indiana's
power to commit an individual indefinitely rests on one of two bases:
(I) the interest of society in restraining an individual because of danger-
ousness to self or others, or (2) the need of the individual for care or
treatment.12 The Court noted:
It is clear that Jackson's commitment rests on proceedings
which did not purport to bring into play, indeed did not even
consider relevant, any of the articulated bases for exercise of
Indiana's power of indefinite commitment. . . . At the least,
due process requires that the nature and duration of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
the individual is committed .23
In an attempt to justify Jackson's commitment, the prosecutor
relied heavily on the similarities between the Indiana and the federal
procedures of pretrial commitment of incompetent defendants in both
the equal protection and due process arguments.24 While the statutory
provisions of the federal procedure for pretrial commitment are similar
on their face to the Indiana procedure, in practice federal courts subject
the statutory provision to a "rule of reasonableness":
Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed [under 18
U.S.C. § 4246] can be held only for a "reasonable period of
time" necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foresee-
able future. If the chances are slight, or if the defendant does
21. See note 10 supra.
22. 406 U.S. at 737.
23. Id. at 737-38 (emphasis added).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244, 4246-4248 (1970) would seemingly provide for an automatic and
indefinite commitment similar to IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972). The federal provision,
however, has been modified by judicial decision. See cases cited note 3 supra.
The State relied particularly on Justice Frankfurter's decision in Greenwood v. United States,
350 U.S. 366 (1956). In that case, however, Justice Frankfurter merely justified the federal govern-
ment's power to commit a federal prisoner to a mental institution. The major contention of
Greenwood was that the state, as parens patriae, had sole power to commit an individual and that
18 U.S.C. §§ 4244, 4246-4248 were an infringement on state power in violation of the tenth
amendment. No equal protection argument was presented or decided. Further, while there was
some uncertainty in the psychiatric diagnosis in the Greenwood case, there was no such uncertainty
in the Jackson case.
The Greenwood case is noted in 42 A.B.A.J. 451 (1956) and 55 Micii. L. REV. 127 (1956).
See also Foote, A Comment on Pretrial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
832, 838 (1960).
[Vol. 7
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not in fact improve, then he must be released or granted a
§§ 4247-4248 hearing.2"
The Court in the Jackson case has now imposed that "rule of reasona-
bleness" upon the states. A defendant found incompetent to stand trial
in a state court now can be detained only for the minimal time necessary
to determine the probability of his gaining competency. His commit-
ment must be aimed at that goal. If his recovery is improbable, he must
be either released or committed in accordance with the general civil
commitment provisions."
No attempt has yet been made to implement the Jackson decision
and it remains to be seen what form of relief will be afforded these
individuals. 7 Fashioning remedies for those individuals already commit-
ted under unconstitutional statutes presents some difficulties in itself.2"
Generally, however, the goal is to restore the individual to a condition
at least equivalent to his precommitment state. To that end, four basic
requirements should be satisfied: (1) disposition of the criminal charges,
(2) reconsideration of the nature and duration of confinement, (3) resto-
25. 406 U.S. at 733.
26. See notes 66 to 130 infra and accompanying text.
27. In Indiana, where the Court's decision should have the most impact, the criminal courts
are simply delaying their rulings on suspected mentally ill defendants until the State initiates
contemporaneous civil commitment procedures in courts of civil jurisdiction. Post-Tribune (Gary),
Jan. 28, 1973, at A-7, col. 5. No attempt, however, has been made by the courts, legislature or
detaining institutions to release or recommit those individuals previously committed as incompe-
tent to stand trial. A class action suit is now pending in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, requesting that the State be required to provide
guidelines for releasing or recommitting these individuals. Anderson v. Murray, Civil No. 73S13
(N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 30, 1973).
The State attributes its delay to the "vagueness" of the decision and the failure of the Court
to establish adequate guidelines for such procedures. Post-Tribune, supra. Perhaps a more funda-
mental reason for such recalcitrance is the distrust of anyone deemed mentally ill and the notion
that "Isociety has as much right to be protected from the mentally ill as those persons have to be
protected from illegal confinement." Id. (statement of Lake County prosecutor and criminal court
judge). This same fear was expressed in New York after the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), which resulted in the release or recommitment of approximately
1,000 prisoners whose sentences had expired but who were detained in institutions for the criminally
insane. For a description of "Operation Baxstrom," the administrative implementation of the
Baxstrom decision, and the resultant community reaction and legislative response to the transfer
of these patients, see Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the
Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the
State of New York, 17 BUFF. L. REv. 651, 670-78 (1968).
28. Part of the difficulty of fashioning general remedies for such cases is engendered by the
varying condition of each incompetent defendant, such as his present mental condition, the length
of his detainment, his need for financial assistance and the nature of the pending criminal charges.
The problem is further complicated by the variety of remedies available from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
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ration of maximum civil liberties, and (4) compensation for the unwar-
ranted deprivation of the individual's civil liberties.
DISPOSITION OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES
The pending criminal charges pose a somewhat unique problem for
the incompetent defendant. After suffering a long confinement in a state
mental institution" (usually under the strictest security 0 ), the defen-
dant is again faced with the prospect of incarceration." Such a prospect
not only has a detrimental effect on his mental health,32 but may also
violate his constitutional rights to a speedy trial" and due process. 4
29. Morris, for example, reported that the average stay at Matteawan Institute for the
Criminally Insane (where New York incompetent defendants are incarcerated) was between six
and seven years compared with an average stay of four months at civil detention centers. Morris,
supra note 27, at 656. A study of the Ionia Institute in Michigan indicated that over 50 percent of
the patients committed as incompetent to stand trial would spend the rest of their lives at the
institute. Comment, Insane Persons-Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1961).
30. See, e.g., J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSCtiOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW 701-02 (1967) (chart comparing restrictions at Bridgewater Treatment Center and Mas-
sachusetts State Prison at Walpole).
31. See note 5 supra.
32. The adverse effect seems to manifest itself in two different ways. The patient may give
up all hope of ever gaining release and simply acquiesce to the surrounding environment, sometimes
becoming catatonic. Comment, Insane Persons- Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L. REV.
1078 (1961). The patient may also feel that the confinement is unjust and react violently to
continued detention. See, e.g., Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
33. For cases holding that the incompetent defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated,
see Marshall v. United States, 337 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (partial delay because ofdefendant's
incompetency); Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (seven year delay because
of defendant's incompetency); United States ex rel. Wolferdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (alternative holding); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (25
month detention without treatment); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 11. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970); People v. Delfs, 31 Misc. 2d
655, 220 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 1961); cf United States ex rel. Hill v. Johnston, 321
F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (contention had merit but defendant was required to exhaust state
remedies before invoking federal habeas corpus).
Many courts, however, have held that the right to a speedy trial is not violated by delays
engendered by incompetency proceedings. The general justification for such holdings is that the
state is not the cause of such delays. See, e.g., United States v. Smalls, 438 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.),
cer. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971); United States ex rel. Thomas v. Pate, 351 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 962 (1966); United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966);
Barfield v. Settle, 209 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Demers v. Miami Circuit Court, 249 Ind.
616. 233 N.E.2d 777 (1968); State v. Jackson, 252 Iowa 671, 108 N.W.2d 62 (1961); People v.
Chambers, 14 Mich. App. 164, 165 N.W.2d 430 (1968); State v. Violett, 79 S.D. 292, 111 N.W.2d
598 (1961).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), indicates that
four factors must be considered in determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial: (I) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's responsibility
to assert his right to trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant's case. In the context of the incompe-
tent defendant the state may well have a substantial reason for delaying the trial. Pate v. Robinson,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1973], Art. 5
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Moreover, the individual may wish to vindicate himself for his own self
respect.
Dismissal of the criminal charges ostensibly removes the purpose
for the defendant's commitment. The state must thus either release the
incompetent defendant or proceed with a civil commitment hearing. :5
Disposition of the criminal charges naturally forces a reevaluation of a
patient's condition and hopefully will lead to restoration of the maxi-
mum civil liberties warranted by the defendant's condition." Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, dismissal of the charges may be accomplished
by statutory provisions, by the prosecutor, or by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Statutory Dismissal
Some state statutes require the dismissal of charges after the in-
competent defendant has been detained for a specific portion of the
383 U.S. 375 (1966). Where, however, the defendant has made a demand for trial and asserts that
he has a good defense, further delay would seem unjustifiable even in light of the Barker decision.
Cf. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
34. See cases cited note 33 supra. In United States ex rel. Daniels v. Johnston, 328 F. Supp.
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the defendant's right to a speedy trial was deemed inapplicable but the court
found that the defendant, who had been confined over eight years, had been denied due process.
In United States ex rel. Wolferdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court held:
[Rielator's incarceration among the "criminally insane" for 20 years because of his status
as an insane defendant (presumed innocent) named in an untriable indictment violates his
protection against cruel and unusual punishment as it is enforceable against the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 68. Jackson's counsel also raised the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment but, because of its holding on due process and equal protection, the Court
found it unnecessary to reach that claim. 406 U.S. at 739.
35. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370 (West 1970).
36. Of course, if the same institutional doctors who made the initial determination of incom-
petency are also the reviewing doctors, much of the value of a review of the patient's condition is
lost. A recent experiment by Dr. David Rosenhan, professor of psychology and law at Stanford
University, emphasizes the need for an independent evaluation of a patient's mental condition. In
a three year study of a dozen institutions throughout the country, Dr. Rosenhan and several
associates had themselves committed by alleging that they heard voices. Although they studiously
resumed normal behavior after admission and attempted to convince staff members that they ought
to be released, in some instances it took up to 52 days to gain release even though most had been
admitted voluntarily under laws which make discharge mandatory on request within 72 hours.
Dr. Rosenhan maintains it is the nature of the institution, not the inability of the staff, which
distorts their perception of the patients' behavior. Reported in Newsweek, Jan. 29, 1973, at 46-47.
In DeMarcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1943), the court considered it more
important to provide indigent patients with an independent psychiatric examiner to rebut the
testimony of the institution psychiatrist than to provide him with counsel. See also United States
e.v rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969);
Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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maximum sentence he would have received if found guilty." Given the
length of detention of most incompetent defendants 8 these statutes can
prove quite useful.
State statutes which prescribe specific lengths of time within which
a competent defendant must be brought to trial or have charges dis-
missed have no direct application to the incompetent defendant.3 9 The
defendant's disability and hospitalization are merely considered a pause
in the proceedings and not a part of them. It is conceivable, however,
that once the disability has been removed and the court and prosecutor
have been notified, the statute again begins to run. Should the state fail
to resume the proceeding either by means of a hearing on the defen-
dant's competency or a trial on the merits, the charges should be dis-
missed." Such an application of state speedy trial statutes, of course,
would occur only where a court ignores a recovery notice from the
hospital administrators."
These statutes, despite their desirability, will have only a limited
application to most incompetent defendants. They are in force in only
a minority of jurisdictions and they may be inapplicable to a given
defendant because he has not been committed for the requisite amount
37. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 730.50 (McKinney 1971).
38. See note 29 supra.
39. See, e.g., Demers v. Miami Circuit Court, 249 Ind. 616, 233 N.E.2d 777 (1968); State
v. Jackson, 252 Iowa 671, 108 N.W.2d 62 (1961); People v. Chambers, 14 Mich. App. 164, 165
N.W.2d 430 (1968).
40. Logically, speedy trial statutes are aimed at curtailing delays when the case could go
forward. In such cases, the burden of proceeding with the trial should be on the state. Cf Dickey
v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970). In State v. Violett, 79 S.D. 292, III N.W.2d 598 (1961), however,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota firmly rejected this position. The facts of the case were as
follows: in 1954 the petitioner was found incompetent to stand trial on manslaughter charges and
was committed to the state hospital for the insane;, in 1956 the superintendent of the state hospital
indicated that the defendant was sufficiently competent to stand trial; the defendant was not
returned until 1959 after repeatedly requesting to be returned for trial. The court, while admitting
that the delay may have prejudiced the defendant's case, nonetheless found that such-delay was
inherent in incompetency proceedings and did not deny the defendant a speedy trial. The court
stated that
[u]nless there was more delay than was reasonably attributable to mental incompetency
to stand trial, the delay was consistent with the ordinary processes of justice and would
not entitle accused to discharge. . . . [W]e are not impressed with the argument that the
record discloses that there was an unreasonable delay that was not a direct or indirect
consequence of mental incompetency in returning accused to Pennington County for trial.
Id. at 603.
41. The reluctance of courts to hear restoration cases often accounts for extended delay in
the re-initiation of the trial process. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 417. Inadvertence or
clerical error may also cause such delays. Cf Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 901 (1969).
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of time." Since it is desirable to avoid protracted litigation where possi-
ble, the next stage is to approach the office of the prosecutor.
Dismissal by the Prosecutor
Dismissal of the charges by the prosecutor is another means of
disposing of the problem without resort to litigation. Some state statutes
specifically authorize the prosecutor to dismiss the charges against an
incompetent defendant after a reasonable length of commitment.13 This
is apparently little more than an affirmation of the inherent authority
of his office."
Ideally, the prosecutor will exercise his discretion rationally in de-
termining whether the state has any valid interest in resuming the crimi-
nal proceedings. 5 Some of the considerations he may take into account
are the nature and duration of the defendant's confinement, the severity
of the pending charge, the probability of the state's success on the merits
(including the defendant's possible defenses), the possible dangerousness
of the defendant, and possible sentence limitations. 6 Probably more
than anything else, the nature and severity of the charges pending
against the incompetent defendant will be the controlling factor.,'
42. For example, under N.Y. CODE CRI,1. PRO. § 730.50 (McKinney 1971), an indictment
charging only a misdemeanor must be dismissed if the defendant is still incarcerated in a state
mental institution after 90 days. In the case of felonies, the charges must be dismissed if the
defendant is still detained as incompetent after serving two-thirds of the maximum sentence he
could have received if found guilty. Further, such dismissals bar any subsequent prosecution on
the same charges.
43. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.020(7) (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-
506(b) (1969).
44. F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: TIlE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 10
(1969).
45. Field studies would seem to indicate that most prosecutors exercise their discretion
rationally, at least in those cases where an accused is remanded to court as restored to competency.
A. MATTIEWS, supra note 2, at 147-49. Generally, the prosecutor will either enter a motion to
dismiss or negotiate a guilty plea with defense counsel. Id. at 147. Where, however, the defendant
has not been restored to competency and the prosecutor does not have to face the prospect of
trial, he may decline to act. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wolferdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp.
66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prosecutor refused to dismiss indictment even though defendant would never
be brought to trial).
46. Guidelines for the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion are often necessarily vague to
insure the flexibility needed to administer a complex system of criminal justice. Breitel, Controls
in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CIIm. L. REV. 427 (1960). None of the criteria listed are
binding on the prosecutor, although they appear to be the factors most generally taken into
account. A. MATTHEWS, supra note 2, at 147. See also Kaplan, Prosecutorial Discretion-A
Comnment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965) (personal account of the decision-making process in the
ollice of the United States Attorney).
47. Kaplan, supra note 46, at 181. Matthews suggests that it is the probability that the
defendant will commit a serious crime in the future rather than whether he committed one in the
past which motivates most prosecutors. A. MATTHEWS, supra note 2, at 149.
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Some prosecutors may feel that the state has a valid interest in
leaving the charges pending because of a feeling that too much laxity
may lead to an abuse in incompetency proceedings, i.e., defense lawyers
may raise the issue of incompetency in bad faith with the hope of
ultimately having the charges dismissed after a brief detention in a
mental institution. Where the defendant is charged with a serious crime,
defense lawyers may indeed be more inclined to employ the incompe-
tency issue as a defensive shield to delay or avoid prosecution. Yet the
incompetency hearing theoretically provides an adequate safeguard
against less than meritorious claims. There is considerably less reason
for fear of abuse where the defendant is charged with a relatively minor
crime. In fact, such cases usually present quite a dilemma for defense
attorneys. Often it is better to avoid the incompetency issue altogether, 9
thus avoiding the possibility of commitment beyond the maximum sent-
ence available.
There are very few guidelines for a prosecutor to follow in exercis-
ing his discretion other than common sense and the need for pragmatic
administration of criminal justice. Sanctions against the prosecutor are
largely indirect, i.e., through the ballot box and the bar.5 0 He is both
agent and advocate representing the state in arbitration between the
defendant and the criminal justice system. His position makes him natu-
rally distrustful of appeals from "suspected criminals."
It is possible that the prosecutor, who is in close contact with his
community, will lose some of his objectivity in such cases and succumb
to the prevalent local prejudices against anyone deemed "mentally ill." 51
There is also the possibility that the state may have a valid interest in
leaving the charges open, as for example where the prosecutor fully
expects the defendant to be fit for trial without an inordinate delay. In
either case, to adequately dispose of the pending criminal charges with-
out the aid of the prosecuting attorney, it would be necessary to return
to the court of original criminal jurisdiction or to initiate a collateral
judicial proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Judicial Dismissal
Should the prosecutor be recalcitrant, resort to the courts is inevita-
48. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 160, 161 n.78 (1971) (survey of
50 cases disclosed defense raised the competency issue 46 times, generally where prison term of
greater than live to 15 years could be expected).
49. A. MATTIIEWS, supra note 2, at 92-93.
50. F. MILLER, supra note 44, at 298-306.
51. A. MATTHEWS, supra note 2, at 149.
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ble. Litigation to dispose of the criminal charges could take several
forms depending on the procedural technicalities within a given state.
Some states, for example, will permit limited pretrial motions to be
made in the court of original criminal jurisdiction.52 These motions are
generally limited to those which are solely the product of counsel and
do not require the participation of the defendant.53 Motions which
merely involve a legal determination, such as the insufficiency of an
indictment, are clearly permissible. 4 The defendant would not have to
assist his counsel in the preparation of such a motion or furnish any
factual evidence in support of the motion.
A few states have apparently gone beyond the "limited participa-
tion" statutes and will permit an evidentiary hearing or even a trial to
determine if there is any merit to the charges pending against the defen-
dant. 55 The advantage of such procedures to the incompetent defendant
is clear: it permits him to establish his innocence without permitting a
conviction. The time and expense the state expends in litigating a case
from which it can never secure a conviction seem justified on the
grounds that it may clear an innocent defendant and may also avoid
protracted litigation at a later stage when evidence is less available.
Absent statutory authorization permitting limited pretrial motions
or hearings, some states have adhered to the common law position that
all proceedings related to the pending criminal charges are terminated
until the defendant is restored to competency. 6 Not even motions which
52. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 24a (Cum. Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123,
§ 17b (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-506(c) (1971); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 730.60(5)
(McKinney 1971); Wis. STAT. § 971.14(6) (1971).
53. These statutes are apparently modeled after the provision of the Model Penal Code
which provides:
The fact that the defendant is unfit to proceed does not preclude any legal objection to
the prosecution which is susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the
personal participation of the defendant.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) (Final Draft, 1962).
54. The emphasis in these statutes is upon the personal participation of the defendant. See
note 53 supra.
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 17b (1972). In People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46
Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970), on facts barely distinguishable from the Jackson case, the court
stated:
[Tihis defendant, handicapped as he is and facing an indefinite commitment because of
the pending indictment against him, should be given an opportunity to obtain a trial to
determine whether or not he is guilty as charged or should be released.
Id. at 285, 263 N.E.2d at 113. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(4) (Final Draft, 1962) (alterna-
tive proposal).
56. The common law rule, as stated in Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir.
1899). is that "[ajn insane person can neither plead to an arraignment, be subjected to trial, or,
after trial, receive judgment, or after judgment, undergo punishment."
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are solely the product of the defendant's counsel are permitted. 7 In such
cases a collateral attack on the pending charges would seem necessary.
A collateral attack to enjoin the prosecution of the defendant, in
either state or federal courts, is theoretically possible.5" In practice,
however, such remedies are difficult to obtain. 59 It is difficult to construe
the peculiar situation of the incompetent defendant into that class of
cases in which injunctive relief has traditionally been granted. Disre-
garding the somewhat arbitrary distinction between personal and prop-
erty rights, the nature of the irreparable injury involved in the instant
case remains somewhat abstract. While the impending criminal charges
may impair the defendant's mental health,'" the possible damage is
elusive of proof. As to the violation of the incompetent defendant's
constitutional rights, there is no reason to suspect that the defendant
could not interpose them as a defense when and if the state attempts to
resume the criminal proceedings.6"
The practicality of disposing of the criminal charges prior to the
resumption of proceedings by the state is greatly diminished both by the
probability of success and the inherent procedural difficulties. The
Jackson decision, however, may afford some affirmative relief in this
area. While the Court abstained from dismissing the charges, it clearly
indicated that a state may not hold the charges pending indefinitely and
commented generally upon the desirability of permitting some proceed-
ing to go forward regardless of the issue of incompetency." More explic-
itly, it removed any barriers to such procedures based on Pate v.
Robinson."3 In Pate, the Court held that it was a violation of due
process to convict an incompetent defendant even where the issue was
not formally raised at trial. 4 Narrowly construed, the case does not
prohibit the trial but only the sentencing of the accused.6" Whether these
suggested procedures will be implemented is, of course, dependent on
state courts and legislatures. The Court, however, has provided that
57. Cf. United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (defendant could not
participate in the dismissal of the indictment against him); Negro v. Dickens, 22 A.D.2d 406, 255
N.Y.S.2d 804 (Ist Dept., 1965) (trial suspended except for motion to dismiss by prosecutor).
58. E.g.. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
59. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne
v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
60. See note 32 supra.
61. Cf. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
62. 406 U.S. at 740-41.
63. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
64. Id. at 385.
65. This is the apparent construction of the Pate case by the Jackson court. 406 U.S. at 741.
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vital initial thrust in suggesting solutions to perhaps the most technical
procedural problem confronting the incompetent defendant.
Disposing of the criminal charges is, of course, only one means of
obtaining impartial treatment for the incompetent defendant. Once the
purpose for the pretrial commitment has ended and a swift return to the
criminal process is no longer probable, the defendant is again entitled
to the same considerations applied generally to all others irrespective
of the pending charges. Methods of obtaining that impartial treatment
will now be considered.
NATURE AND DURATION OF CONFINEMENT
Commitment of an incompetent defendant is premised on a speedy
recovery so that the criminal process may proceed without inordinate
delay." Such a delay works an injustice on the defendant and defeats
the interest of a state in the effective administration of criminal justice.67
Commitment to a state mental institution may in itself be a cause of
such a delay. Rather than aiding the defendant to a rapid recovery, the
very nature of these institutions often impedes and sometimes reverses
any meaningful progress the defendant might make towards recovery.68
Even where the defendant does recover, his improved mental condition
will often go unnoticed, and consequently unreported to the committing
court."
The recent trend of therapeutic care of the mentally ill is toward
the "least restrictive means" of confinement. 0 The movement is toward
a restoration of the maximum freedom from restraint warranted by the
66. Eizenstat, supra note 6, at 400; Foote, supra note 24, at 839.
67. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
68. See note 170 infra.
69. The limited staff found in most institutions virtually precludes periodic review except on
a limited basis. Patients often only see the psychiatrist once every six months for an hour interview.
Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REV. 623, 631-32 (1971).
See also Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968), where the court noted
that Whitree was given only one psychiatric staffing in the 14 years he was detained and periodic
psychiatric examinations as much as 15 months apart.
70. The trend is toward both a rejection of inpatient hospitalization and a recognition that
treatment cannot be coerced:
Few experts today recommend hospitalization, particularly in the large public mental
hospital, as the preferred setting for treatment to occur. Those who defend hospitalization
do so in terms that exclude most public mental hospitals, which generally remain under-
staffed, overcrowded, and distant. . . . Separation, it is now believed, impedes reintegra-
tion into community life; and the isolation of hospitalization, coupled with other aspects
of institutionalization, breeds further withdrawal and deterioration.
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill. Practical Guides and Constitu-
tional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1113 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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individual's condition through conditional release and various forms of
outpatient care.
The response of the courts to this change in the attitudes toward
treatment has largely been inflexible in regards to the needs of the
incompetent defendant. With a few notable exceptions,7 the courts have
almost invariably ordered institutionalization 2 rather than examining
the various alternatives to commitment. Although some state statutes
provide that the defendant may be committed to any "appropriate"
psychiatric institution,' :' most courts have made little use of them.74
Consequently, most incompetent defendants are held considerably
longer than necessary.
The Jackson case clearly provides a basis for reexamining the na-
ture and duration of the incompetent defendant's commitment. Viewed
analytically, the Jackson Court divided the commitment of an incompe-
tent defendant into two periods: (1) a period of observation, and (2) a
period of treatment. In the first instance, the incompetent defendant can
only be held for the period of time necessary to determine the probabil-
ity of recovery.7" The period of treatment can be justified only by an
improvement in his condition." In most cases, no determination is made
concerning the patient's chances of recovery. Even in those cases where
such a determination is made, given the conditions of most state institu-
tions, the chances that the suggested treatment will lead to a reasonably
swift recovery are highly remote.77 In either situation, the defendant
must either be released or recommitted under the customary civil stat-
utes.
The condition of the incompetent defendant will largely determine
the type of relief (recommitment, conditional release or absolute re-
lease) he may expect. In some cases, for example, the state may be
71. The District of Columbia Circuit has perhaps been the most active in exploring alterna-
tive means of treating the mentally ill. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
72. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
73. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (1968).
74. The recurring problem of the failure at the district court level to explore various alterna-
tives to hospitalization caused Justice Clark to comment:
This Court questions the commitment of the accused to such an institution under such
conditions and again suggests that in exercising their discretion District Judges consider
carefully the advisability of commitment to local medical facilities where available and
adequate.
Henry v. Ciccone, 440 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1971).
75. 406 U.S. at 738.
76. Id.
77. See note 170 infra.
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unable to recommit the defendant under the general civil commitment
statutes."5 In other cases, assuming the state has a substantial interest
in bringing the defendant to trial, it may have to adopt more flexible
treatment standards to insure progress towards the goal of recovery."
RELEASE OR RECOMMITMENT: AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
The problem of obtaining relief presents considerable difficulties.
The first step is to secure a reevaluation of the incompetent defendant's
condition. Based on that condition and the desires of the defendant,
affirmative relief in the form of recommitment, conditional release or
absolute release must then be sought.
The review of mental conditions on a case by case basis is not
particularly amenable to the judicial process. There are statutory provi-
sions for judicial discharge of the mentally ill in a majority of states,s0
and in every state habeas corpus is available to seek release from an
illegal confinement."s These provisions, however, would generally be
available to the incompetent defendant only if he had allegedly re-
covered and was challenging the validity of his continued confinement. 2
78. The Supreme Court indicated, for example, that Jackson himself was perhaps uncommit-
able under the Indiana civil commitment statutes. He apparently was not dangerous and the care
he was receiving at his home seemed, on the record, entirely adequate. 406 U.S. at 729.
79. Cf McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972) ("defective" delin-
quent cannot be detained indefinitely where he refused to cooperate in treatment).
80. See. e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2923 (1968).
81. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 139.
82. It is extremely difficult to generalize on the availability of these remedies to the incompe-
tent defendant due to the wide variety of statutes in force. For example, some states require a
medical certificate, attesting that the patient has recovered, to accompany the application for
judicial discharge. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-27 (1963). In a few states, however,
even unimproved patients may petition and be released under the judicial discharge statutes. E.g.,
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-3-4 (1968) (any person hospitalized although not recovered may be
discharged by a supreme court justice).
Habeas corpus relief also varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Habeas corpus
petitions generally provide for a determination of mental illness at the time of the writ to determine
eligibility for release. IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1307 (1964); Edenharter v. Conner, 185 Ind. 643, 114
N.E. 212 (1916) (extending habeas corpus to determine sanity at the time of the writ). In some
states, however, habeas corpus may only be used to determine the legality of the proceeding under
which the patient was committed. Douglas v. Hall, 297 S.C. 550, 93 S.E.2d 891 (1956). In the
District of Columbia, habeas corpus is available not only to challenge the legality of confinement,
but also the degree of security a patient requires. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (habeas corpus available to determine eligibility for transfer from maximum security to civil
hospital). For a thorough analysis of habeas corpus and judicial discharge in New York, see
Morris, Habeas Corpus and the Confinement of the Mentally Disordered in New York: The Right
to the Writ, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 27 (1968).
There may be some initial question of the applicability of judicial discharge statutes to incom-
petent defendants because of the specific conditions for release specified in statutes concerning
1973]
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While this situation may apply to some defendants, many more may not
seek absolute release, but may desire continued psychiatric care on a
less restrictive basis. Moreover, in many cases a defendant's condition
simply does not warrant absolute release. Where he presents a substan-
tial danger to himself or the community, the state's interest in his con-
tinued confinement is certainly substantial.
Individual petitions to a court to examine the nature and duration
of confinement, even where available,' 3 approach the problem in a
piecemeal fashion. Furthermore, many individuals serving indefinite
sentences because of their incompetency will go undetected. The release
action must be initiated by the individual or by a person on his behalf.8 4
To place the responsibility on the incompetent defendant, who is gener-
ally unaware of his rights in this area, seems hardly justifiable.
Hospital authorities would appear to be in the best position to
implement the Jackson decision. Ostensibly, they know the incompetent
defendant's previous history, his present mental state and the type of
treatment the patient requires. '-' Moreover, in most states they have the
authority over the transfer, parole or absolute release of involuntary
patients, subject generally to the notification of interested parties."6
Under the Jackson rationale, the release provisions available to those
committed civilly should be available to the incompetent defendant.
Most administrators, however, would undoubtedly be reluctant to as-
sume such authority without judicial affirmation of its existence. They
may well be expected instead to cling to the statutory provisions for the
release and confinement of the incompetent defendant. 7
Various forms of proceedings in state and federal courts are avail-
able to compel the administrators of state mental hospitals to establish
an adequate procedure to implement Jackson. The remedy sought
would seem to fall into one of three categories-mandamus, mandatory
incompetency to stand trial. See note 3 supra. Under the Jackson decision, however, the means of
release available to other mentally ill patients not charged with crime must also be available to
the incompetent defendant. Any other conditions, such as restoration of competency to stand trial,
imposed on the requirement for release of incompetent defendants would constitute a clear viola-
tion of equal protection.
83. See, e.g., Henry v. Ciccone, 440 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d
249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); In re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972).
84. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-546 (1967).
85. This is perhaps questionable in some cases given the infrequency of review of the patients'
conditions in some institutions. E.g., Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct.
Cl. 1968).
86. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-524 (Supp. 1970). In a few states the approval
of the central agency is also required. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 66-337 (1969).
87. This is apparently the case in Indiana. See note 27 supra.
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injunction or declaratory relief, depending on how the court construes
the request for relief and the available statutory guidelines. The system
of extraordinary remedies in the state courts varies considerably from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction; thus it is difficult to predict the proper rem-
edy in a given jurisdiction."' The complexity of the system of extraordi-
nary remedies in the state courts has led one writer to comment:
An imaginary system cunningly planned for the evil pur-
pose of thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless litigation
would copy the major features of the extraordinary remedies.
For the purpose of creating treacherous procedural snares and
preventing or delaying the decision of cases on their merits,
such a scheme would insist upon a plurality of remedies, no
remedy would lie when another is available, the lines between
remedies would be complex and shifting, the principal concepts
confusing, the boundaries of each remedy would be undefina-
ble, judicial opinions would be filled with misleading generali-
ties, and courts would studiously avoid discussing or even men-
tioning the lack of practical reasons behind the complexities of
the system."'
While the complexity of state remedies does not foreclose relief, it
certainly renders federal proceedings more practical.
REDRESS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The federal courts offer a more satisfactory and flexible forum in
requesting the affirmative relief needed to implement Jackson.
Moreover, a federal court may be expected to be detached sufficiently
from state policy and prejudice to render a more objective opinion. The
same aloofness from state affairs, however, which leads to impartial
judicial decision-making also accounts for the obstacles hindering en-
trance into the federal court system: jurisdictional and policy limita-
tions.'" In the present case, however, jurisdiction is easily established.
Incompetent defendants, as a class of citizens, are being deprived
of their constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.', The
broad purview of 42 U.S.C. § 198392 clearly creates a cause of action
88. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 24.01 (3d ed. 1972).
89. Id. at 458.
90. I J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE " 0.6 (2d ed. 1972).
91. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
1973]
et al.: Remedies for Individuals Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
222 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
to redress the deprivation of such rights under the color of state law.
Jurisdiction is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1343.11 Upon such a basis it
is clear that a federal court has the power to act if it so chooses. Jurisdic-
tion, however, is not the only obstacle which must be overcome. The
abstention and exhaustion doctrines may also hinder federal relief.
Abstention and Comity
The nature and history of federalism call for restraint on the part
of federal courts wherever deference to state courts and legislatures is
"appropriate." To this end, various policies have grown to curtail the
unfettered exercise of federal power. The chief obstacles to the exercise
of federal power are the self-imposed policies of abstention and com-
ity." In the context of enjoining state mental health laws and redressing
the deprivation of liberty under those laws, federal courts have been
generally more receptive to entertaining the action.15 In cases in which
they have abstained, they have usually had reasonable grounds. For
example, in Fhagen v. Miller,"6 the court abstained from deciding the
constitutionality of a recently enacted New York statute providing for
emergency admission of the mentally ill because the New York state
courts had not been given the opportunity to interpret their own statute.
The court noted the recentness of the legislation, the thoroughness with
which it was prepared and, most importantly, the history of the New
York courts in narrowly construing such statutes and avoiding constitu-
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
An action for declaratory and injunctive relief is also authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely creates a cause of action: it does not establish jurisdiction. In
the present case, however, jurisdiction is clearly conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). Cf.
Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972); Sczerbaty v. Oswald, 341 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
94. Basically, abstention and comity are merely discretionary withholdings of federal relief
where state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a cause of action. See IA J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.202-.203 (2d ed. 1965) for a summary of the principles governing
the use of abstention and comity.
95. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In Lessard v. Schmidt, supra, the court stated that
[p]rinciples of federalism and comity do not require this court to refuse to act when to do
so would only discourage the assertion of federal constitutional rights and perhaps cause
irreparable injury to persons subject to involuntary loss of freedom as the result of the
challenged commitment procedure.
Id. at 1084.
96. 312 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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tional violations through interpretation. 97 Given the history of the New
York legislature and courts in devising fair and impartial treatment for
the mentally ill, the decision seems basically sound.9"
Federal courts, however, need not always await a state court's
interpretation of a statute before acting. "9 The course of judicial re-
sponse to the plight of the mentally ill has been quite clear over the past
decade. The failure of state legislatures to enact appropriate legislation
in this area renders federal judicial action necessary to protect the in-
competent defendant's constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection. The mere possibility that a state legislature or judiciary may
act in the near future is an insufficient basis for a federal court to defer
its judgment.9 0 The federal constitutional rights at stake in these instan-
ces clearly outweigh any state interests which call for abstention by the
federal courts.
Exhaustion of State Remedies
For similar reasons, the exhaustion doctrine requiring a plaintiff to
first seek redress in state courts would seem inapplicable to the present
case. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not require exhaustion
of state administrative or judicial remedies,' 0' particularly where those
remedies do not afford a realistic alternative for relief. 02 The general
unavailability of state administrative and judicial relief is apparent in
the present case. The incompetent defendant has no means to initiate
administrative action, and while a writ of habeas corpus is available in
theory, it is difficult to acquire in practice.' 3
Some federal courts, however, have construed actions challenging
the constitutionality of confinement under Section 1983 as petitions for
release by federal habeas corpus.' 04 In such cases they have held that
Section 1983 may not be used as a substitute for habeas corpus relief
97. Id. at 328.
98. E.g., Neely v. Hogan, 62 Misc. 2d 1056, 310 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1970); In re Buttonow, 23
N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968); People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d
87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
99. The Jackson Court explicitly rejected this argument. 406 U.S. at 729 n.8.
100. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
101. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
102. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
103. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Gaito v. Ellenbogen, 425 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1970); Bennett v. Allen, 396 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1968); King v. McGinnis, 289 F. Supp 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
For a discussion of the history and general applicability of the exhaustion requirement in
federal habeas corpus actions, see R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS §§ 22-23 (1965).
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to circumvent the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1"5 In
Wilwording v. Swenson, 00 however, the Supreme Court held: (1) that
the case is properly brought under Section 1983 when the conditions of
confinement are challenged, and (2) that a federal court cannot require
an exhaustion of state judicial remedies even if they are available.
The key, then, to whether exhaustion is required is the extent to
which the petition is construed as a petition for release. Arguably, in
the present case the relief sought is not release, but merely a determina-
tion of the plaintiff's eligibility for release or recommitment under the
same criteria as applied to all others committed involuntarily. In Gomez
v. Miller,'0 7 where the constitutionality of New York's incompetency
statute was challenged, the court found this logic persuasive. The court
stated:
[T]he instant case is not properly classified as a habeas
corpus matter. Plaintiffs here seek merely a limited determina-
tion of dangerousness as a prerequisite to retention at Mattea-
wan. Granting the relief they seek will not result in their release
from custody. To secure freedom they must, as the convening
judge said, traverse two gates: a determination of non-
dangerousness and a finding of competence. °8
The implementation of other decisions affecting large numbers of pa-
tients committed in mental institutions would indicate the validity of the
distinction made in Gomez between release and review. In "Operation
Baxstrom,"' 09 none of the approximately 1,000 patients directly affected
were granted immediate release."" The implementation of Dixon v.
Commonwealth"' resulted in the outright release of only 1.5 percent of
the patients affected by the decision."' What did result from these deci-
105. E.g., in King v. McGinnis, 289 F. Supp. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court stated that
[pilaintiff [an incompetent defendant incarcerated for approximately 16 years] has as yet
not exhausted his state remedies, and he should not be permitted to circumvent the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by seeking federal adjudication of the legality of his
confinement in a civil rights act suit.
Id. at 468.
106. 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
107. 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
108. Id. at 328.
109. "Operation Baxstrom" was the administrative implementation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), requiring mentally ill convicts whose sentence
had expired to be transferred from maximum security institutions to civil institutions.
110. Morris, supra note 27, at 671.
I1l. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
112. 10 DUQUESNE L. Rov. 674, 676 (1972).
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sions was a review of each patient's need for continued confinement. The
relief requested is thus only an intermediary step toward release or
recommitment."'
The difficulty engendered by this type of case in which either fed-
eral habeas corpus or a Section 1983 action would seem appropriate is
largely due to the expansion of both remedies in an effort to protect
federal rights." 4 In many instances, except for the exhaustion require-
ment attached to federal habeas corpus," 5 appropriate relief could be
granted under either construction of the petition. To require exhaustion
of state remedies merely because habeas corpus may also be appropriate
tends to obscure the real issue of whether there are any legitimate
reasons for requiring exhaustion."'
NATURE OF RELIEF
The same policy considerations which influence a federal court to
take jurisdiction in the first instance are often determinative of the type
of relief the court will grant. The court seeks, where practical, to make
the least possible intrusion on state affairs. Where declaratory relief will
establish the desired result, a federal court is hesitant to issue a sweeping
order for reform." 7 Where, however, a state policy obstructing federal
rights is likely to go unchanged without mandatory relief, such relief is
usually granted.
In the context of mental health, the relief granted by federal courts
has taken a variety of forms. For example, in Bolton v. Harris,"' the
court merely enjoined future operation of a statute providing for the
automatic commitment to institutions for the criminally insane of per-
sons found not guilty by reason of insanity. While urging the hospital
concerned to establish procedures for the release and treatment of
individuals confined previously, the court did not go so far as to estab-
113. Many federal courts, even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), had adopted the "total release" doctrine which exempted prisoners
from the exhaustion requirement where the relief granted would not result in total release from
confinement. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1970); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d
816 (3d Cir. 1968); Holland v. Ciccone, 386 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Knight
v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 ( 1965); Hancock v. Avery, 301
F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). See also Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
114. Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 69-70 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
116. Cf. notes 98 and 99 supra and accompanying text.
117. A declaratory judgment may, of course, be as coercive as a mandatory injunction in
some cases. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948).
118. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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lish such procedures."' In Dixon v. Commonwealth,120 on the other
hand, the court established an elaborate procedure for the release of
incompetents who were committed involuntarily to maximum security
sections of mental institutions.
Several factors may account for the difference in the relief granted
in the two cases. In the District of Columbia, habeas corpus was more
readily available to those individuals affected to secure their release than
in Pennsylvania.' Moreover, the court in Bolton fully expected volun-
tary compliance on the part of the hospital largely because of the court's
previous experience with its administrators.12 Perhaps the most decisive
difference between the two cases was the difference in the facilities
themselves. The Bolton court had previously examined the condition of
the facilities for the incarceration of the criminally insane and had taken
measures to alleviate the harshness of such confinement. 23 In the
Dixon case, however, the court was shocked by the inadequate and
deplorable conditions of the institution in which the plaintiffs were de-
tained and perhaps felt the need for immediate redress.'24
The same considerations which led the Dixon court to establish
compulsory state standards probably exist in a majority of jurisdic-
tions."' The procedure established by the Dixon court for the release or
recommitment of involuntarily committed patients presents an adequate
model to assure the relief required by the Jackson decision. 2 The court
established a three-tiered process. The first stage involved an informal
exchange between the hospital, the patient and the patient's family. The
hospital had to evaluate the patient, discuss with him a proper course
of treatment and then seek voluntary compliance with the patient on the
disposition of his case (either release or recommitment to the facility
least restrictive of his freedom and nearest his home).
119. Id. at 652 n.58.
120. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). See also Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (requiring and setting out administrative hearing procedure prior to detention in maxi-
mum security section); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (requiring hearing
procedure for persons detained under Wisconsin emergency commitment law).
121. In the District of Columbia, a petitioner may obtain a writ of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge the nature of his confinement irrespective of his present mental state. Covington v. Harris,
419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Pennsylvania, however, the patient must have a physician certify
that he is sane. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4426 (1969).
122. See, e.g., Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Watson v. Cameron,
312 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
123. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
124. Cf Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
125. See note 170 infra.
126. 325 F. Supp. at 973-75.
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If the hospital and the patient failed to reach an agreement, the
hospital had to initiate the second stage, a full judicial hearing. 27 The
hearing procedure, a model of fairness,' 21 was designed to correct most
of the deficiencies previously existing in commitment proceedings. Per-
haps most importantly, the court specified a maximum time (six
months) during which the individual could be detained under the com-
mitment order.
The final tier of the commitment process was a state appellate
review of the findings. The defendant had to be advised of his right to
appeal and, if indigent, had to be furnished a complete transcript and
counsel.
Subsequent studies show the workability of such a procedure.,"
The administrative burden of requiring a full judicial hearing proved to
be minor. Only 2.5 percent of the patients incarcerated were involuntar-
ily recommitted through this process. Only a small minority were dis-
charged and the rest recommitted themselves voluntarily under various
terms of confinement. 30
The deplorable conditions the court found in Dixon are unfortun-
ately all too typical of the institutions to which incompetent defendants
are summarily sent. In some respects release or recommitment which
merely reverses past errors is hardly adequate to compensate for the loss
these individuals have suffered. The prospect, however, of achieving
restitution in the form of money damages is highly remote.
DAMAGES
The basic purpose for seeking damages from the state or its agents
is to compensate the individual for both the monetary and personal
losses he has suffered. 3' This involves a recognition that the state is
responsible for the unwarranted deprivation of the defendant's liberty
and is best able to bear the loss. 32 Monetary compensation cannot, of
127. Id. at 974.
128. While the hearing was modeled after the basic requirements of the juvenile hearing in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967), the court in some respects went even further. For example, the
court not only required that the patient be informed of his right to counsel, but also required that
counsel and independent medical experts be provided for indigent defendants. Moreover, the
burden of proof was placed on the State to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
patient "[p]oses a present threat of serious physical harm" to himself or others. 325 F. Supp. at
974.
129. 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 674 (1972).
130. Id. at 676.
131. C. MCcORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 1 (1935).
132. See, e.g., Note, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 1091 (1970).
1973]
et al.: Remedies for Individuals Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
228 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 7
course, totally restore the individual. Much of what the defendant has
lost is not easily measured by monetary value. Yet this remains the
traditional and most practical form of restitution. A money award not
only compensates for past losses, but also aids the defendant in his
transition from confinement to freedom. 33
An ancillary purpose of money damages is to provide a positive
sanction against a state for abusing its police power. A state's power to
confine an individual indefinitely is not absolute. As one authority notes
in connection with the incompetent defendant:
The only legitimate purpose of commitment is to prepare de-
fendants for trial. If this cannot be accomplished in a more
certain, less dilatory manner, the recuperative purpose behind
incarceration becomes a dangerous pretense. '4
This was the precise rationale of the Jackson decision. The mere release
of accused defendants may provide little motivation for a state to volun-
tarily limit the unconstitutional extension of its police power.,3 The
prospect of liability for damages, however, may provide that motiva-
tion.,"'
The incompetent defendant undoubtedly deserves compensation for
that period of his detention which was unlawful under Jackson. While
theoretically he has a variety of means of recovery, in practice the
probability of success is extremely limited.
Judicial Recovery
Depending on the particular circumstances of the defendant, he
may well have one of several causes of action sounding in tort.'37 The
practicality of initiating suit, however, depends largely upon finding a
responsible defendant who is not shielded by immunity. While immuni-
ties are rapidly being abrogated by judicial and legislative action, they
nonetheless present an obstacle in many jurisdictions. In addition, the
133. Cf id. at 1097 (noting the indigency of most federal prisoners upon release and lack of
employment for a considerable period thereafter).
134. Eizenstat, supra note 6, at 400.
135. The fear of abuse by public officials was the historical foundation justifying exemplary
damages. C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 288 (1935); W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 4, at 23 (4th ed. 1971).
136. 82 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1776 (1969) (comment on the possible effects of the large
damage award in the Whitree decision).
137. See generally Note, Civil Liability of Persons Participating in the Detention of the
Allegedly Mentally Ill, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 193.
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practicality of initiating a protracted lawsuit diminishes greatly where
the financial position of the incompetent defendant is desperate.,"
Generally, the first difficulty is stating a claim against a responsible
defendant. While there are a variety of common law theories of recovery
against an individual for wrongfully depriving another of his liberty, '
very few are amenable to the peculiar circumstances presented here. The
gist of any action based on Jackson is that the incompetent defendant
is confined longer than the reasonable time necessary to restore his
competency. Conceivably this could occur in two situations: (1) where
the patient is untreatable, but nonetheless confined under the inapplica-
ble statute, or (2) where the patient is treatable, but failure to provide
adequate treatment unduly prolongs that confinement. It is possible
then to focus on the unlawful detention and base a cause of action on
false imprisonment'40 or, in the alternative, to focus upon the negligent
treatment and base a cause of action on psychiatric malpractice. " ' In
either case, the action must be brought against the detaining institution
largely because its claim of either judicial or official immunity is the
most tenuous to maintain.
An overwhelming number of state courts, however, have rejected
the liability of the institution or responsible official for confining an
individual pursuant to a court order.'42 Although several theories have
been offered, it is generally held that the institution or its agent is
immune as a "quasi-judicial" officer.1 3 While the "fault" for such
confinement under an invalid statute may well rest with the judiciary,
the absolute immunity of that branch prohibits recovery. 144
A negligence action against the hospital or its administrator, based
upon the breach of its duty to provide the care necessary to restore the
individual to the trial process within a reasonable time, would clearly
138. See note 133 supra.
139. E.g., false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process.
140. Even though the initial detention may have been valid, false imprisonment may still lie.
The most analogous situation is where a jailer fails to release his prisoner at the end of his sentence.
See, e.g., Weigel v. McCloskey, 113 Ark. 1, 166 S.W. 944 (1914); Waterman v. State, 2 N.Y.2d
803, 140 N.E.2d 551, 159 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1957). See also Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. Ill (N.D. III. 1972).
Where the prosecutor has refused to drop the charges and is arguably responsible for the
further incarceration of the defendant, he too may be held liable. Cf. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d
183 (5th Cir. 1971).
141. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599 (1965).
142. See Annot., 145 A.L.R. 711 (1943).
143. Id.
144. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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focus on that aspect of the incompetent defendant's incarceration for
which it is responsible. In Whitree v. State,"5 the court based liability
on medical malpractice and allowed recovery of damages in the amount
of $300,000. The court first found that the state owed a duty to provide
rehabilitative psychiatric care to the individuals it incarcerates as in-
competent to stand trial. 4 ' The failure to provide that care consonant
with the medical standards in the community constituted a breach of
that duty." 7 The measure of damages was assessed according to the
period for which Whitree was improperly detained because of the inade-
quate care."' With proper treatment the court found Whitree could have
been released three to six months after his commitment. His actual
release, however, did not come about until over 14 years later. Whitree
was also awarded damages for the consequential injuries he received
while incarcerated." 9
The Whitree case merely recognizes that the care available to some
patients should be available to all patients irrespective of the legal status
of their commitment. The major propositions of the Whitree case in
awarding damages may lack precedent,5 0 but its rationale is characteris-
tic of those cases concerned with the emerging right to treatment.' 5' The
judicial system seems to be losing its tolerance of inadequate facilities
and care for the mentally ill accused of crime:
[Slociety denominates these institutions as hospitals and they
should be so conducted. If they are to be no more than pens
into which we are. to sweep that which is offensive to "normal
society" then let us be honest and denominate them as such.5
145. 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
146. The court drew an analogy to two prison cases in which it previously found a duty on
the part of the state to provide adequate medical treatment for prisoners. Id. at 706, 290 N.Y.S.2d
at 500.
147. This is apparently the first time a court has found inadequate care to be a basis of
liability in a psychiatric malpractice case. Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599 (1965) (Supp. 1972).
148. 56 Misc. 2d at 708, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 507. While false imprisonment is exclusively an
intentional tort, negligence which results in false imprisonment is also actionable where actual
damage results. Cf Mouse v. Central Savings & Trust Co., 129 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929).
149. The personal injuries from beatings and maltreatment were quite extensive and are well
worth reviewing to gain insight into the life in a mental institution. 56 Misc. 2d at 710, 290
N.Y.S.2d at 504.
150. See criticism of the case in 82 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1969).
151. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Nason v. Supt. of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233
N.E.2d 908 (1968).
152. 56 Misc. 2d at 711, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
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An award of damages may well stimulate the states to improve those
conditions which the court found so deplorable in Whitree.
The award of damages in the Whitree case was possible not only
because the court devised an adequate theory on which to base a cause
of action, but also because of the New York law regarding immunity
of state hospitals. '13 In other jurisdictions, the probability of success
will depend on how their state courts have dealt with the concepts of
sovereign immunity and the official immunity extended to state mental
institutions and physicians.'54
It is possible to avoid litigation in state courts by basing a claim
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of civil rights
under color of state law.5 5 This possibility again focuses on the real issue
of the Jackson case-the unwarranted deprivation of the incompetent's
constitutional rights. The federal courts, however, have assimilated the
common law theories of tort immunities and defenses into the Civil
Rights Act.' While immunities are generally more narrowly construed
in federal courts than in state courts, they nonetheless reduce the pros-
pects of recovery considerably.' 7
Establishing a claim against a responsible defendant is only an
initial difficulty. Other obstacles involve the difficulties and expense of
proving fault and proximate cause. 5' Establishing a proper measure of
damages,' 9 while not in itself an express bar to recovery, may actually
153. In New York, the state is liable for the negligence of its doctors. Stephens v. Dept. of
Health of Orange Co., 65 Misc. 2d 308, 317 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Orange Co. 1970).
154. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952).
155. See note 92 supra.
156. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray,, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
157. Given the general principles of tort immunity which the federal courts have incorpo-
rated into Section 1983 actions, it is perhaps not surprising that individuals basing damage actions
on erroneous confinement in mental institutions have met with little success. See, e.g., Joyce v.
Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (Ist Cir. 1963) (official immunity and good faith); Cooper v. Wilson, 309
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962) (quasi-judicial immunity to witness making false statement at insanity
hearing); Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1959) (quasi-
judicial immunity of committing doctor); Kennedy v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956) (judge and
doctor granted judicial immunity); King v. McGinnis, 289 F. Supp. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (state
was real party in interest). But see Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966) (psychiatrist liable
for imposing work program could not claim official immunity); Delatte v. Genovese, 273 F. Supp.
654 (E.D. La. 1967) (coroner testifying falsely at insanity hearing could not claim judicial immun-
ity). Cf. Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971).
158. See, e.g., Beaumont v. Morgan, 427 F.2d 667 (1st Cir. 1970) (insufficient evidence);
Ploof v. Brooks, 342 F. Supp 999 (D. Vt. 1972) (defendant institutional doctors were not the
proximate cause of injury).
159. The method derived by the Whitree court would seem the most equitable form of
compensation to the incompetent defendant.
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tend to limit the amount recoverable. Moreover, a class action under
Section 1983 (to reach as many prospective plaintiffs as possible) is
highly desirable.6 0 However, such actions often present considerable
obstacles to damage awards because of the difficulty of apportioning
claims among the numerous plaintiffs.'
Arguments basing or denying relief on common law torts or the
immunity or nonimmunity of a given official often detract from the real
issue of the case. Moreover, there is a certain injustice in placing the
blame on any one individual for the inadequate commitment proce-
dures, inadequate state mental hospitals and overextension of police
powers. It is the social entity-the state-which should bear the burden
collectively.' In states where sovereign immunity has been abrogated,
this may be possible through judicial action. However, another means
of "shifting the loss" to the state is through the legislature.
Legislative Recovery
Legislative remedies may also be available to the incompetent de-
fendant in the form of private bills and general statutes providing for
state liability for the erroneous confinement. 3 In addition, some states
provide a small stipend for the period of time during which the incompe-
tent defendant was confined in a state hospital under a sanctioned work
program. The opportunity for abuse of such programs, however, has
made this form of relief somewhat undesirable. 4 The lack of availabil-
ity and the limited scope of these forms of legislation greatly curtail
their usefulness to the incompetent defendant.
Other writers have described and commented upon the process of
achieving relief through legislative bills and the general desirability of
this form of relief over the judicial theories of recovery based on fault. 165
It is difficult, however, to assess how sympathetic state legislatures will
be to the incompetent defendant. 66 They may well prefer to alleviate the
generally poor conditions of state institutions rather than to direct spe-
cific funds to a class of injured parties.
160. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
161. The problem could be avoided, however, by requesting a flat sum to be paid to each
incompetent defendant who warrants release or recommitment.
162. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 25.01-27.07 (3d ed. 1972).
163. Note, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
1091, 1107-12 (1970).
164. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 166-67. Cf Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129
(2d Cir. 1966).
165. Frankel, Preventive Restraint and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law of the
Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229 (1968); Note, supra note 163.
166. See notes 99 and 100 supra and accompanying text.
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The prospect of recovery through either legislative or judicial ac-
tion remains somewhat remote. Courts have on occasion, nevertheless,
awarded huge money damages for such unlawful confinement "' and
legislatures have provided bills to redress the victims of erroneous con-
finement.' 8 The prospect of such recovery, however remote, may also
serve to stimulate lethargic legislatures into providing adequate legisla-
tion to insure the impartial treatment of all the mentally ill, irrespective
of pending criminal charges.
CONCLUSION
If the empirical data on pretrial commitments is at all reliable, the
Jackson decision should be of considerable importance due to the sheer
number of people directly affected." 9 These individuals represent the
largest class of court-related commitments and also represent the most
compelling case for relief. The condition of many state mental hospitals
for the criminally insane has been documented all too vividly.' 0 It is
barely tolerable to justify such conditions for those individuals who have
been convicted of a crime and represent a danger to society;'' it is less
167. E.g., Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693,
290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
168. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 1970).
169. A considerably large proportion of the inmates at institutions for the criminally insane
have been committed because of their incompetency to stand trial. A national sampling indicated
this group constituted 52 percent of the patient population of such institutions while the group
composed of prisoners transferred while serving sentence, the second largest grouping, constituted
only 17 percent of the patient population. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 578. In New York's
Matteawan Institute for the Criminally Insane, 74 percent of the patients were classified as incom-
petent to stand trial. Morris, supra note 4, at 413 (1968 confinement figures).
170. Most state mental hospitals, largely because of low budget priorities, fail to meet even
minimum requirements for custodial care, let alone psychiatric treatment. The requirements for
the physical condition of psychiatric facilities are set forth in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIA-
TION, STANDARDS FOR PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES 64-66 (1969). As Dr. Birnbaum has noted, most
state mental hospitals are characterized by overcrowded conditions, dilapidated facilities, inade-
quate dietary programs and inadequate sanitation works which fail to comply with the minimum
standards of the American Psychiatric Association. Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "'The Right to
Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REv. 623, 631 (1971). Coupled with inadequate facilities is the problem
of inadequate staffing. Not only are state mental institutions understaffed, with ratios of one doctor
to 800 or 900 patients all too common, but in many states these professional personnel are
unlicensed within the state. Id. at 631-32.
Particular institutions have become somewhat infamous because of judicial decisions high-
lighting their inadequacies. See, e.g., Ploof v. Brooks, 342 F. Supp. 999 (D. Vt. 1972) (Vermont
State Hospital); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (Bryce Institute in Ala-
bama); Nason v. Supt. of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (Bridge-
water Institute in Massachusetts); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. CI.
1968) (Matteawan Institute in New York).
171. See, e.g., United States ex reL Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 847 (1969).
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tolerable to impose such conditions for an indefinite period on a defen-
dant still presumed innocent.
The Jackson case presumably brought an end to the practice of
automatic and indefinite commitment of the incompetent defendant.
Yet there are currently thousands of individuals who should benefit
from the decision but remain behind institutional walls.
Disposition of the criminal charges, besides being an end in itself,
may also be a means of obtaining the further relief of release or recom-
mitment. Under the Jackson case, however, disposition of the criminal
charges may be an unnecessary step in obtaining release or recommit-
ment. The most efficient means of implementing Jackson is mandatory
injunctive relief directing the hospital administration to review each
case. Based on such review, the hospital would then be required to
release or recommit the individual under the general civil commitment
statutes irrespective of the pending criminal charges. As a form of ancil-
lary relief, damages for wrongful confinement may also be available.
Damages may serve to both compensate the individual and to provide
a stimulus for the state to comply with the Jackson decision.
All of these remedies present considerable procedural difficulties.
The best prospect for obtaining these goals lies in the federal forum,
largely because of the more flexible procedures and the prospect of
obtaining multiple remedies within a single litigation. The policies of
abstention and comity, however, may foreclose redress in the federal
courts. While relief in state courts is theoretically possible, most state
proceedings are so imbued with procedural technicalities and the relief
available so inflexible that the substantive issues may never be reached
or appropriate relief granted.
An imaginative court, either state or federal, has the inherent
power to grant affirmative relief to these individuals. The same safe-
guards against indefinite commitment in state mental institutions avail-
able to all citizens should be available to the incompetent defendant.
This is the basic rationale of the Jackson decision. The right to be free
from the arbitrary restraints imposed on the individual because of his
incompetency to stand trial is largely meaningless unless a means is
found to effectuate the Jackson decision. The methods discussed here,
where liberally construed by the courts, may offer that means.
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